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THE PUEBLO, EC-121 AND MAY AGUEZ INCIDENTS:
SOME CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES
ROBERT

I.

R.

SIMMONS

INTRODUCTION

The military response of the United States to the Pueblo, EC121 and Mayaguez crisis reflected less the severity of each crisis
than the military capability available at the time of each incident.
In 1968 and 1969, North Korea staged spectacular acts of
violence against U.S. military craft. On January 23, 1968, it seized
the U.S.S. Pueblo, an electronic surveillance ship, then in
international waters. The crew of eighty-three, which suffered one
fatality during the capture, was released after eleven months. The
ship itself was never returned. On April 15, 1969, North Korea
shot down an unarmed U.S. Navy EC-121 electronic surveillance
aircraft over international waters. The entire crew of thirty-one
was killed.
The U.S. military reactions to each of these provocations
included demonstrations of military capabilities, but retaliatory
military violence was not used in either of them. In both cases,
firm words and naval task forces were dispatched rapidly to the
scene, but armed retaliation was not undertaken. In contrast,
Cambodia's seizure of the U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez on May
12, 1975 prompted a quick and violent military reaction.
This paper examines some of the continuities and differences
among these incidents in terms of causes, U.S. responses and the
impact of the military responses on the outcomes. Available
sources indicated that one factor dominated these differences the war in Indochina. Heavily engaged in Southeast Asia in 1968
and 1969, U.S. armed forces imply were not prepared to risk a
simultaneous war over either the Pueblo or the EC-121. Political
and public enthusiasm for a possible additional struggle in Korea,
moreover, was low. These constraints were not operable at the
time of the Mayaguez crisis when both military forces and
political support were available for a limited action. Indeed,
political sentiment seemed to favor a violent response that might
redress, in some measure, the recent U.S. defeats in Indochina.
The curious thing is that, regardless of these differences, the
U.S. military response in each of these three crises apparently had
little impact on the immediate outcome, but was perhaps of
greater significance for later incidents. The crew of the Pueblo
was not returned any earlier in 1968 because of the U.S. show of
force. The lack of a violent response to the seizure of the Pueblo
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may, in turn, have contributed to North Korea's willingness to
take risks (such as shooting down the EC-121) but it did not seem
to affect the negotiations over the Pueblo itself. The EC-121 crisis
was essentially over immediately, for the crew died during the
plane's destruction. The only option then open to the United
States - an option it did not exercise - was a military retaliation.
The lack of a violent response this time did not seem to affect the
North one way or another. The U.S. response to the seizure of the
Mayaguez was violent, out of all proportion to the incident itself.
The ship and its crew would have been returned without this
demonstration of military might. As suggested below, however,
one benefit emerged, perhaps unintended, from this use of
violence. The U.S. action was viewed by decision-makers around
the world as irrational - an advantage for a state dealing with
erratic foes, such as North Korea, that otherwise wish to foment
crises. An illustration of a later outcome of the 1975 Mayaguez
crisis is the murder by North Korean soldiers of two U.S. soldiers
at Panmunjon in August 1976 (the first Asian crisis after the
Mayaguez episode). It seems possible that the demonstrative U.S.
action following that incident achieved added credibility because
of the violent U.S. response to the seizure of the Mayaguez.
II. THE PUEBLO

The United States and the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (DPRK) waged a bitter war between 1950 and 1953. Since
then, each side has feared and suspected the other. Premier Kim Il
Sung, an intense nationalist, has stridently proclaimed his antiUnited States foreign policy goals and proudly built his authority
on the slogan of "chuch'e": autonomy and self-reliance. Mter
1953, North Korea continued to proclaim its intention to liberate
South Korea from the grasp of U.S. imperialism. For its part, the
United States maintained a defense treaty with the Republic of
Korea (ROK) and this relationship appeared threatening to North
Korea.
This mutual apprehension increased during the Vietnam war
because each saw that conflict as a reflection of the shared
hostilities. In October 1966, Kim Il Sung delivered an uncompromising speech reaffirming his intention to reunify the peninsula.
This speech ("Let Us Defend Independence") condemned both
"modern revisionism" (the USSR) and "left opportunism" (China).
Shortly thereafter, President Lyndon B. Johnson visited Seoul to
declare his solidarity with South Korea. These reciprocal warn-

THE PUEBLO

3

ings were underscored by an increase in armed incidents in the
Demilitarized Zone and by subversive activities directed against
South Korea. In 1966, there had been 50 incidents; in 1967, 729; in
1968, 761.1 In 1967, more than 1,500 U.S. reconnaissance flights
flew near the borders of North Korea. A "senior advisor for
national security" said that the number of these flights during the
preceding two years had "just increased and increased." 2
The DPRK experienced a rapid increase in its defense budget
as it dramatically increased the number of incursions into the
South. Moreover, it had staged a purge which had the effect of
promoting professional military men interested in armed conflict
with the South. The typically fervent anti-United States, antiSouth Korea rhetoric became even harsher. Meanwhile, relations
with the People's Republic of China (PRC) turned frigid, with Red
Guard Posters in the spring of 1967 calling Kim Il Sung a "fat
revisionist". There were even reports of "shooting incidents" on
the China-North Korea border. 3 Ties with the USSR were correct
but apparently not warm. The North was embarking on a hard,
independent course. By the end of 1967, with this background of
military tension, it was evident that Korea had the potential to
test the U.S. ability to react decisively in more than one military
crisis at the same time.
On November 17, 1967, Pyongyang radio announced that it
had "taken measures" against a group of more than one hundred
fishing vessels that entered North Korean territorial waters. It
made a similar broadcast, charging another incursion, on
December 8 and reported on December 22 that North Korea seized
"armed espionage boats disguised as fishing boats" during
another mass "infiltration" into its waters by a South Korean
fishing fleet. On January 6, 1968, Pyongyang radio announced:
The U.S. imperialist aggressor army, which has been
incessantly committing provocative acts lately on the sea off
of the eastern coast, from 0600 hours this morning again
dispatched many armed boats, mingled with fishing boats,
under the escort of armed warships into the coastal waters of
our side.

1. Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security (Brookings Institution,
1975), p. 163.
2. Trevor Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability: The Truth of the Pueblo
Affair (Corward-McCann, 1970), p. 183.
3. New York Times, November 23, 1970.
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The broadcast concluded that the continuation of such "reckless
aggression" would result in "100-fold" retaliation by North
Korea. 4 Seoul radio reported on the same day that the North had
seized five of seventy ships in a fishing fleet during this incident.
The Pueblo was preparing to sail from Japan for its mission
on January 8. It was unlikely that this particular news would
have halted the Pueblo's sailing, however, because only South
Korean ships had previously been bothered.
The attack on the Pueblo began at approximately 11:30 P.M.
(EDT) on January 22. The Pueblo initially encountered one Sovietstyle SO-l subchaser which carried a nineteen-man crew and
mounted a fifty-seven-millimeter canon. The subchaser was soon
joined by another subchaser of the same type, four motor torpedo
boats and two North Korean MIGs which patrolled the operating
area. After it was seized, the Pueblo was escorted to Wonsan
Harbor (North Korea) where it arrived at 6:30 A.M. (EDT) on
January 23_. 5
An attack on the Pueblo had been unexpected for three
reasons:
1. The Pueblo's sister ship, the USS Banner, had sailed
along the coast of China, the USSR and North Korea since
1965 without being fired upon. The Banner had operated off
the coast of Wonson in January 1967 for about thirty-six
hours and on one other occasion in the same year for eleven
hours in the same general area where the Pueblo was later
captured. In fact, when the Pueblo was seized, the Banner
was on its way to patrol off Siberia. Infrequently harassed, it
had not had to fire a single shot during its missions. Based
on this precedent, there was no adequate military backup.
The U.S. Fifth Air Force was to be kept informed about the
Pueblo and a number of its F-105s were on two-hour alert on
Okinawa, approximately 850 miles from Wonsan, but no
naval units were allocated to these missions. A further
intangible, but salient factor that contributed to the lack of
close and constant awareness of the Pueblo's potential
danger was summarized at 1969 Congressional Hearings by
Rear Admiral Frank L. Johnson, commander of the U.S.
Naval Forces in Japan at the time of the crisis. "[H]ad there
4. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts (Janu·
ary 8, 1968), FE/2663/ A3/6.

5. Commander Lloyd M. Bucher, Bucher: My Story (Doubleday & Co., 1970),
pp. 178-83.
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been any reason to suspect an unlawful seizure after 150
years or more of no such seizures, I would not have ordered
an unescorted AGER (auxiliary general environmental
research) on the mission." 6 The Banner had received naval
support on only two of its sixteen missions. The Pueblo
traveled alone as well.
2. It was also presumed that North Korea's foreign
policies were under the strong influence of the USSR. The
USSR operated its own intelligence ships and had not seized
any U.S. intelligence vessels. U.S. Admiral Thomas H.
Moorer reported that the USSR at this time employed forty
unarmed intelligence collection ships. Some, he said,
occasionally have violated our territorial waters, but
none has been attacked or fired upon by our forces nor
has any of their crew been seized or killed. In fact, when
these ships had been notified that they were in U.S.
territorial waters and, in accordance with international
law, were requested to leave, they did so. 7
It was, therefore, considered unlikely that a Soviet ally would
violate a tacit naval agreement with the United States.
Consequently, the captain and crew of the Pueblo, as well as
superior U.S. command authorities, were surprised when the
ship was seized.
3. Since Premier Kim's October 1966 speech, the North's
accusations had increased in ferocity and in frequency.
Hence, they had lost much of their impact. Radio Pyongyang
elaborated on the charges on January 8. "This once again
proves that the U.S. imperialist aggressors are further
aggravating tension in Korea and running wild to provoke a
new war ... thus causing a grave situation in which a war
may break out at any moment." 8 The North Korean signals
of willingness for action had been misread by Washington.
Rear Admiral John Victor Smith, the senior negotiator for
the UN command in Panmunjon, for example, had labeled
these warlike messages "the usual communist garbage".
Rear Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, then Chief of Naval
6. Inquiry Into the U.S.S. Pueblo and EC-121 Plane Incidents, House of
Representatives, Committee on Armed Services (GPO, 1969), p. 735.
7. Ibid., pp. 635-36.
8. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts (January 9, 1968), FE/2664/ A3/16.
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Operations, later explained Admiral Smith's remark on the
grounds that "similar warnings had been issued on prior
occasions and there was nothing to indicate that the North
Koreans were referring to anything other than fishing
vessels." 9 This evaluation, however, ignored the seizure of
South Korean fishing boats in increasing numbers, the rapid
increase of incursions into the South and the raid by a team
of North Korean commandos on the South Korean presidential mansion just before the seizure of the Pueblo.
A.

The U.S. Military Response

The United States, almost totally preoccupied with the
burdens of Vietnam, was not prepared to cope quickly with a
second conflict. At the time of the seizure of the Pueblo, the
nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise and the frigate
Truxton were 510 miles southwest of the port ofWonsan where the
Pueblo was taken. Although there were fifty-nine fighter aircraft
aboard the Enterprise, only thirty-five were operational. Four F4B Phantoms with a speed of Mach 2 and a range of more than
1,500 miles were on five-minute "alert". The alert F-4Bs, however,
were intended to defend the carriers from air attack and so were
equipped with air-to-air "Sparrow" and "Sidewinder" missiles. It
was estimated that it would have taken approximately three hours
to refit these aircraft with air-to-surface missiles and send them
off to the Pueblo; by that time dusk would have fallen. 10
Two A-4 and F-4 Marine squadrons based in Japan were then
receiving air-to-surface attack training with non-nuclear weaponry. It is conceivable that they could have reached the Pueblo
during the two hours before it arrived at Wonsan, but these
squadrons were not informed about the Pueblo until the next
morning. 11 At the time of the Pueblo's capture, there had not been
a "strip alert" by U.S. Air Force fighters which would have
provided the capability of a quick nonnuclear armed response.
Similarly, they were unprepared to fight off the 450 Mig defenders.
By contrast, in mid-January 1968, readily available (but nucleararmed) U.S. land-based military aircraft in the immediate region
were seven fighter-bombers in Korea, eighteen on Okinawa and
sixteen in Japan.
9. Ibid., p. 638.
10. Ibid., p. 896.
11. Ibid., p. 900.
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Brigadier General John W. Harrell, commander of the U.S.
Air Force in the Republic of Korea, stated a few days after the
seizure that he had received "no instructions to prevent its capture
or come to its rescue," 12 apparently because the forces under his
command were not conventionally armed.
Because the U.S. planes on alert in South Korea itself were
equipped with nuclear weapons, aircraft were requested from
Okinawa. By the time these aircraft reached South Korea,
darkness was about to fall, so the aircraft were not dispatched to
the scene. South Korean aircraft, under UN and not U.S.
command, were not asked to assist. Moreover, South Korean
planes were not equipped with delivery capabilities adequate to
the rapid response the situation called for. Furthermore, Washington was probably reluctant to risk Seoul becoming as adventuresome as Pyongyang if encouraged to liberate the Pueblo.
Even if aircraft armed with conventional air-to-surface
weapons had been available for use over the Pueblo before dusk, a
question would be, what would be gained by the use of military
power? A New York Times editorial of January 24, 1968
appreciated the risks of a military reaction when it warned,
"Whatever the facts may prove to be, the incident does present, as
the White House has observed, 'a very serious situation.' Such a
situation must not be dealt with in passion, for it could lead to a
sharp and dangerous new escalation of the Asian war." President
Johnson himself recalled, "We know that if we wanted our men to
return home alive we had to use diplomacy. If we resorted to
military means, we could expect dead bodies. And we almost
might start a war.'' Similarly, the P~cific Command believed that
"use of our aircraft, instead of saving our men, would endanger
their lives, and they conclude that the pilots of the aircraft would
be taking an unacceptable risk, in view of the large number of
North Korean jet fighters massed in the area around Wonsan,
North Korea."l3
The President's stress on diplomacy reflected an acknowledgment of the pressures already bearing on U.S. military response
capabilities. The difficulty of mounting a swift response, the
shortage of appropriate military force and uncertainty about a
North Korean reaction to a U.S. military strike were joined to
another factor: Was the seizure of the Pueblo signaling an
imminent invasion of the South?
12. Washington Post, January 29, 1968.
13. Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point (Popular Library, 1970), p. 536.
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Almost immediately, Washington ordered the dispatch of a
large task force (77) to approach Wonsan. These ships were to
include three cruisers (Providence, Canberra and Chicago), five
carriers (Enterprise, Ranger, Yorktown, Kearsage and Coral Sea)
and eighteen destroyers. As this task force moved into the Sea of
Japan, the USSR positioned a squadron of about a dozen vessels
close to the U.S. ships; specifically, Kotlin and Kashin class
destroyers, tankers and the trowler Gidrolog, equipped with
Pueblo-type electronic devices to intercept communications and
14
radar.
-- - Because of this Soviet naval presence, the involvement of the
USSR in the Pueblo crisis remained for the moment unclear.
Although the purpose of the Soviet ships was uncertain to
Washington, the United States noted with dismay that its
requests to the USSR (transmitted by U.S. Ambassador Lewellyn
Thompson) to intercede with North Korea were quickly turned
aside.
In the first half day after the seizure, Washington was aware
of two developments. Conventionally armed planes could not
reach the Pueblo before dark and U.S. naval vessels were
proceeding toward Korea. But the question of whether North
Korea had acted without Soviet encouragement remained for the
moment unanswered. Another factor under consideration was
potential intensification of the fighting in Vietnam which would
place additional heavy demands upon the U.S. military.
In this context, President Johnson and the National Security
Council had evaluated the options for military retaliation. After
much discussion, the possibilities were reduced to: (1) an attempt
to storm Wonsan Harbor and retrieve the ship by force; (2) seizure
or destruction of one or more North Korean ships in retaliation or
for potential bargaining power; (3) aerial bombing and sinking of
the Pueblo at the Wonsan docks to deny to the Communists access
to the intelligence gathering equipment on board; and (4) a naval
blockade of Wonsan and perhaps other North Korean ports. 15
Faced with the continual drain caused by Vietnam and a
growing loss of support in the public and in Congress, the
President was not willing to run the risk of increasing incidents
and violence with North Korea (and perhaps, by extension, of
gambling with the developing detente with the USSR). Nonethe14. New York Times, January 25, February 8, 1968.
15. Ibid., January 25, 1968.
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less, Johnson decided to transmit a signal of warning to North
Korea.
He wanted to do something pretty quick, another former
White House aide says, but he was in the position of not
knowing, not finding anything that looked like a very good
thing to do. He talked to McNamara, Rusk, Rostow, Clifford.
He telephoned Sam Berger, (Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs), in the middle of the night.
His message: Give us more ideas, more alternatives; think
them out. 16
The essence of these consultations, along with individual
comments by important U.S. leaders, was widely publicized by
means of official or "leaked" observations, a mechanism that
allowed both the domestic audience and the targets (Pyongyang
and its anticipated instructor, Moscow) to appreciate the range of
choices available. The main thrust of those signals was that
Washington would prefer a negotiated settlement to the incident
but did not totally rule out the use of force.
Viewing this crisis as a square in a larger chess board,
President Johnson dramatically signaled U.S. determination to
rely on a mixture of force and diplomacy for the Pueblo situation.
He ruled out military power to retrieve the Pueblo because it ran a
high risk of unacceptable consequences. His reluctance to use the
military was reinforced by the expectation that heavy demands
would shortly be placed on the U.S. military in Vietnam. A
specific indication that Task Force 77 was not to be used with an
operation connected with freeing the Pueblo was sent by General
Earle Wheeler on January 24:
10:25 A.M.: It is desired that no show of force be deployed in
area of Pueblo incident. Hold all forces south of 36-00N until
further advised ... 12:25 P.M.: JCS had directed ... proceed
no further north than present positions. Higbee remain in
company of Enterprise and Truxton. Do not, repeat, do not,
send Higbee to take position off Wonsan. 17
General Wheeler's direction that "no show of force be
deployed in area of Pueblo incident" was perhaps the most concise
description of the objective assigned to Task Force 77 - to
16. Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability, p. 259-61.
17. Ibid., p. 239. Armbrister previously recounts that the destroyer Higbee was
to have been assigned to enter Wonsan Harbor and retrieve the Pueblo crew.
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demonstrate military capabilities, but not to use violence. The last
part of this message referred to the first of the four military
options which had envisioned storming Wonsan harbor to bring
out the Pueblo. Within half a day of the ship's capture, this option
and the other military options that risked a possible second front
had been ruled out because of stretched military capabilities and
the anticipation of an enemy offensive in Vietnam. Once the crew
of the Pueblo had arrived in North Korea, moreover, it was not
known either where they were or precisely how North Korea would
respond. As Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach noted,
"The crew is expendable, but you don't want to expend the lives of
82 men and still not accomplish anything. That would be a
disaster." 1 a In short, the administration publicly underlined a
prudent approach to the Pueblo crisis, combined with a demonstration of military strength.
This approach was highlighted when the President mobilized
14,787 Air Force and Navy reservists on January 25. This was
done without prior consultation with the Congress whose leaders,
agreeing that a rapid, firm stance must be taken, expressed
surprise but no open irritation.
The military mobilization, however, did not affect the
resolution of the Pueblo crisis. The troops mobilized were neither
ordered overseas immediately nor even moved to bases for
eventual deployment. Rear Admiral Frederick H. Michaelis would
assert, "Our units were recalled without deployable equipment.
They were not in a position to be immediately responsive." 19 In
other words, these recently recalled reservists could not have gone
to war. The mobilization was intended chiefly as a demonstrative
military action. In part, the mobilization signaled the U.S.
determination to both allies and adversaries (there were shudders
of apprehension that the Pueblo incident might trigger a new war;
in Paris the volume of gold trading quickly nearly doubled). The
mobilization also signaled to the American audience the administrations's concern about developments in Asia and its willingness
to take serious measures to rectify the situation. There was also
some suspicion that the Pueblo crisis simply provided an excuse
for the first military mobilization during the Vietnam war, just
before an anticipated enemy offensive in Vietnam. In short, the
prime military concern remained Southeast Asia.
18. Ibid., p. 259.
19. Ibid., p. 263.

THE PUEBLO

11

B. Domestic Restraints

The declarations from Washington emphasized restraint but
did not preclude the possibility of violence. Clark M. Clifford, the
President's nominee for Secretary of Defense, summarized the
administration's position in a widely reported testimony before
the Senate Armed Services Committee. He testified that "[t]he
President would like very much to get these 83 Americans out of
the hands of the North Koreans and get them back. And I believe
that he will make every effort along the diplomatic front to
achieve that purpose." 20 On January 26, after the option of a
retaliatory strike had been rejected, President Johnson spoke on
national television:
We shall continue to use every means available to find a
proper and peaceful solution. . . . We have taken and are
continuing taking certain precautionary measures to make
sure that our military forces are prepared for any contingency. . . . I hope that North Korea will recognize the
gravity of the situation they have created. . . . I am
confident that the American people will exhibit in this crisis,
as they have in other crises, determination and sanity. 21
On the same day, Ambassador Arthur Goldberg spoke before
the United Nations Security Council. "It is imperative that the
Security Council act with the greatest urgency. This course is far
more preferable to the remedies which the Charter reserves to
member states." 22 This was a reference to Article 51 of the UN
Charter which permits self-defense for unilateral military actions.
It was a calm warning that the United States had not entirely
ruled out the option of violence. This verbal caution, however, was
given after the administration had rejected the use of force to free
the Pueblo. The demonstration of the availability of a military
option at this time apparently was intended to encourage Moscow
to serve as a mediator in the crisis. The State Department had
announced on January 23 that an "urgent request" for the release
of the Pueblo had been sent to North Korea through the USSR.
Opinion in the United States was divided, but the balance
seemed to favor the doves over the hawks. Senator Richard B.
Russell, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
20. New York Times, January 26, 1968.
21. New York Times, January 27, 1968.
22. Ibid.
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assessed the Pueblo capture as "amounting to an act of war."
Secretary of State Dean Rusk agreed, saying that the seizure was
"in the category of actions to be considered as an act of war." The
House Republican minority leader, Gerald R. Ford, declared that if
diplomacy fails, "the United States must take whatever military
action is necessary" to recover the vessel and crew. 23
More moderate voices were heard as well. Senator Mike
Mansfield cautioned, "We should keep our shirts on . . . . We
should not let our emotions take over. . . . We should not take
military action now . . . . The government should make the
necessary protests and objections through China and the Soviet
Union." 24 Senator J. William Fulbright, chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, urged, "We should be very careful
in this instance not to jump to conclusions until we know all the
facts." 25 "All the facts" apparently referred to the U.S. military
experience in the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident. Fulbright also
continued to hope that the USSR would persuade North Korea to
return the Pueblo. The Pueblo had been seized while the Foreign
Relations Committee was trying to decide whether to conduct a
formal hearing on the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Senator Fulbright
declared that the government had "deceived" the public about
ships in the 1964 incident, in that they were engaged in electronic
intelligence work, as, admittedly, was the Pueblo. Another
member of this committee, Senator Wayne Morse, pursued the
comparison between 1964 and 1968. "The Maddox was a spy ship
under instruction to stimulate the electronic instruments of North
Vietnam, they were carrying out a spying activity." 26
This cloud of gathering suspicion about the 1964 incident
inhibited an unambiguously forceful response in 1968. Moreover,
in 1968, North Korea had seized a functioning electronic
intelligence ship while a draining war continued in nearby
Indochina. The willingness of the American people, therefore (as
expressed by their elected representatives), to support a military
reaction was diluted because of gathering doubts about the causes
of the Gulf of Tonkin incident. The question was whether the
capture of the Pueblo would duplicate the Gulf of Tonkin incident
which had led to the intense involvement in Vietnam.
23. New York Times, January 24, January 25, 1968; Washington Post,
January 25, 1968.

24. New York Times, January 25, 1968.
25. Ibid.
26. New York Times, February 22, 1968.
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The American public was willing to use force to regain the
Pueblo's crew but opposed to a prolonged conflict on a second
front in Asia. The first Gallup Poll after the seizure of the Pueblo
(February 1, 1968) showed that forty percent of those responding
to the poll favored using force to regain the Pueblo; only three
percent felt that the United States should declare war against
North Korea. The Harris Poll in the first week of February 1968
summarized its fmdings on the public attitude toward the crisis:
"It is clear that the American people are prepared to back military
action in Korea, but they do not feel the Pueblo incident justifies
another war." 27
C. Negotiations

At first, Moscow refused to help gain the release of the Pueblo
or its crew. President Johnson had been surprised by Moscow's
brusque rejection of the request, particularly since the USSR had
itself frequently deployed such ships on similar missions.
For years both the United States and the Soviet Union had
been employing intelligence-gathering ships, as well as
planes, and the ships occasionally wandered off course. In
1965 there were two separate incidents of Soviet vessels
entering U.S. waters. We did not make a big issue of the
infringements. We merely ordered them to leave. 28
Despite the initial rebuff, Washington continued to request
Moscow's assistance. Meanwhile, several factors worked together
to create a climate for more favorable response: the decision not to
retaliate, the demonstrations of U.S. military preparedness and
appeals to the USSR as a partner in the use of unarmed naval
intelligence collectors. At the same time, Washington realized that
Moscow did not completely control Pyongyang's decisions and
was displeased with the North Korean action.
At the same time, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin had been
visiting India for talks with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
On January 26, an Indian spokesman reporting on the talks
stated, "Mr. Kosygin described the Pueblo incident as a routine
matter of one country's ship straying in the territorial waters of
27. Cited in New York Times, February 11, 1968.
28. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 534. The captains of these two ships
appeared in an Alaskan court and pleaded "no contest" to the charge of violating
U. S. territorial waters. In these unrelated trials, one ship paid a fine of $5,000, the
other, a fine of $10,000.
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another country and said that it should be treated as such..
The Soviet position is to defuse the matter and not to attach great
importance to it." 29 Reporters attached to Premier Kosygin's
delegation wrote, "Russian officials in Premier Kosygin's entourage indicated today that the Soviet Union is interested in freeing
the U.S.S. Pueblo despite the negative signals Moscow has been
transmitting . . . there is a gap between Soviet actions and
Moscow's first response to American requests for help." 30
- - -- -- On January 28, 1968, The Washington Post, again in a
dispatch from New Delhi, reported that "well-placed Russian
sources" suggested that the ship could be traded for confessions
from the crew and an exchange of prisoners between North and
South Korea. If these were accurate sentiments voiced by Soviet
officials in an effort to mediate, they would have been beneficial.
It should be noted, however, that the USSR quickly denied the
validity of these stories. The Soviet position was repeated publicly
in Pravda's authoritative "Observer" column on February 4:
It is clear that attempts to achieve something from a
sovereign Socialist state, the Korean People's Democratic
Republic, can have no chance of success if accompanied by
threat and pressure. Now it is especially important that the
United States take no rash steps that would further
complicate the situation.
Interestingly, three days after the ship's capture, the North
Korean negotiator at the Mixed Armistice Commission at
Panmunjom stated, "All you have to do is to admit military
provocations and aggressive acts committed by your side,
apologize for them and assure (this Conference) table that you will
not re-commit such criminal acts." 31 While this speech was vague
and did not promise release of the crew, it did suggest some
flexibility. This less than rigid posture was again implied when
Jun Im Chol, Vice President of the Korean Red Cross, predicated
that the Pueblo would not be returned "under any circumstances."32 Again, no mention of the crew was made; reference had
been made to the ship but not the crew.
29. Washington Post, January 27, 1968.
30. Ibid.
31. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts (January 31, 1968), FE/2685/ A317.
32. Washington Post, February 1, 1968. This statement was made in Colombo,
Ceylon.

THE PUEBLO

15

Among other things, this delicate Soviet stance indicated to
Washington that part of the reason for the seizure of the Pueblo
had been Korea's wish to demonstrate an activist stance distinct
from those of the USSR and China. Commander Bucher's
"confession," for example, issued shortly after the ship's capture,
acknowledged that U.S. intelligence vessels had also sailed off of
the coasts of China and the USSR. This statement allowed North
Korea to portray itself as being in the vanguard of the antiimperialist struggle. Recognizing intrabloc disagreement on
tactics, Washington avoided harsh verbal attacks on the USSR
and continued to seek its assistance as a mediator for the crew's
release. President Johnson commented that, after a few days, "in
spite of their initial rebuff of Ambassador Thompson's request,
the Russians were now urging us to act with restraint and we
believe that they could be helpful." 33
Interestingly, there had been an analogous situation less than
half a decade before the seizure of the Pueblo. A U.S. military
helicopter with two pilots had been downed just north of the 38th
Parallel on the Korean peninsula on May 17, 1963. In March 1964,
the United States apologized, claiming that the violation had been
caused by navigational error, but Washington refused to admit
spying. On May 16, 1964, the pilots were released when the United
States signed a statement prepared by North Korea acknowledging espionage. It declared that the helicopter had been "captured
by the self-defense measures of the People's Army while committing military espionage acts after deliberately intruding." 34
Immediately after the pilots were freed, the United States
denounced the signed document as "meaningless".
The helicopter case provided a model of an incident in which
retaliatory force was withheld over a time span about the same as
the detention of the Pueblo. As in the Pueblo episode five years
later, North Korea had demanded an admission of spying by the
United States. In each case, after almost a year's refusal,
Washington signed a paper of acknowledgment which it immediately declared to be false. Therefore, during the 1968 negotiations over the release of the Pueblo, both Pyongyang and
Washington had a precedent to pursue, one that was haltingly but
closely followed. It is interesting that the experience of the

33. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 536.
34. New York Times, May 17, 1964.
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helicopter's capture and release was recalled almost immediately
after the Pueblo's seizure. 35
In a public speech a week after the seizure, the Secretary of
the Central Committee of the Korean Worker's Party rejected a
military solution for the release of the Pueblo crew, but referred to
"the method of previous practice." Washington responded quickly.
Thereupon, Pyongyang agreed to hold private talks. A statement
was drafted by Ambassador Berger, Undersecretary Katzenbach
and Secretary of State Rusk. 36 These sequestered discussions were
more restrained than the vitriolic, open diatribes that usually
characterized U.S.-Korean negotiations. The private meetings
began on February 2 at Panmunjom. North Korea insisted that
the United States had committed the "criminal act of espionage"
and demanded that the United States admit the correctness of this
charge, apologize for the intrusion and promise not to repeat this
criminal action. This acknowledgment, roughly parallel to both
the 1964 concessions and the demands of North Korea throughout
1968, was largely the agreement that did accompany the freeing of
the crew eleven months later.
North Korea's implied call for talks based on the 1963-64
pattern came one day after the beginning of the Tet Offensive. A
"second front" seemed even less desirable to both sides - the
United States because of the intensified involvement in Southeast
Asia and North Korea because of its fear of a U.S. military strike.
More than a year after the release of the Pueblo crew, the senior
North Korean delegate at Panmunjom commented on North
Korea's fear of an attack shortly after the Pueblo's seizure. "We
came near to it ... for a period of two or three months, the entire
people of the southern part (of North Korea) lived in a state of
constant alert. . . . "37
In February, it appeared that fruitful negotiations were
developing. Republican Leader Gerald R. Ford regretted that:
The Johnson Administration apparently is getting ready to
"confess" to North Korea. This comes as a shock to members
of Congress who have relied upon earlier statements by the
Administration and by our Ambassador to the UN, Arthur T.

35. Washington Post, January 24, 1968.
36. Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability, p. 274.
37. Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea (University
of California Press, 1973), p. 985.
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Goldberg, flatly asserting that the Pueblo had not intruded
upon the territorial water of North Korea. 38
To some degree, this limited progress was aided by military
actions. On February 2, 1968, Hungary had advised the United
States that if it wanted the Pueblo negotiations to succeed, it must
move the nuclear powered aircraft carrier Enterprise farther out to
sea. The value of stationing the Enterprise off the Korean coast
lay ultimately less in its ability to carry out shelling and bombing
of North Korea and more in the opportunity to withdraw it in a
negotiating exchange. Mter the private talks began between
North Korea and the United States, the United States agreed to
withdraw the huge aircraft carrier as a symbol of its earnest
desire for the success of the talks. In this situation, the "show of
force" operated two ways. It is probable that North Korea
understood the symbolism of both em placing, and then withdrawing, units of the armed forces as evidence of U.S. willingness to
make concessions. The ship moved on February 7, but the
Pentagon specifically said the carrier was not moved back to a
station off Vietnam. For North Korea, fearful of a possible U.S.ROK military strike, the request for the removal of the Enterprise
was logical. Even after the Enterprise pulled back, the remaining
U.S. naval presence was still impressive. It included the Yorktown
(CV A), Ranger (CV A) and the cruisers Canberra and Chicago.
Moreover, the Enterprise had not actually been near North Korea
but had cruised between Japan and South Korea. By February 20,
the Enterprise was in Subic Bay, the Philippines.
In the first week of February 1968, as North Korean and U.S.
representatives met at Panmunjom, Seoul worried about an
agreement being reached without its knowledge or consultation
because it had been excluded from the talks. On February 11,
1968, the major Seoul newspaper, Dong-A Ilbo, stated:
The United States must realize that connivance with the
Communists over the recent intrusion of a North Korean
commando unit into Seoul in exchange for the release of the
U.S. prestige as well as the loss of confidence by Koreans in
the U.S.
The South Korean National Assembly then adopted a strong
resolution condemning private negotiations between the United
States and North Korea. South Korean Premier Chung Il Kwon
met with U.S. Ambassador William J. Porter and General Charles
38. New York Times, February 6, 1968.

18

CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STuDIES SERIES

Bonesteel, commander of U.S. forces. Premier Chung's demands
were that the problem of infiltration from North Korea take
precedence over the Pueblo, that South Korea be included in all
negotiations and that there be an increase in U.S. aid to Seoul. At
this time, South Korea announced a military mobilization of its
own. In addition to its potential defensive function, the mobilization served as a signal to Washington. Beginning in 1965, South
Korea had sent more than 47,000 troops to Vietnam to support the
U.S. position. South Korean on-line capabilities were therefore
limited. Would the United States fulfill its treaty obligations to its
loyal ally? Or should South Korea withdraw its troops from
Vietnam to prepare its own defense?
On February 11, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cyrus R.
Vance, President Johnson's special envoy, arrived in Seoul to
explain the U.S. position on the Pueblo negotiations. The
communique issued at the end of the talks said that North Korean
actions "seriously jeopardize the security of this area and if
persisted in, can lead to renewed hostilities in Korea." If such
aggressions were to continue, "the two countries would promptly
determine what action should be taken under the Mutual Security
Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States."
This diluted the earlier South Korean request for an automatic
military response to any North Korean infiltration. On the other
hand, Vance agreed that U.S. military assistance to South Korea
should increase markedly while private negotiations and priority
to the Pueblo continued.39
The North Koreans had put up an intriguing photo display in
Panmunjom in the first half of February. Alongside pictures of the
Pueblo crew were photographs of the two U.S. helicoper pilots who
had been shot down in 1963 with their letter of apology and the
acknowledgment from the U.S. government that they had been
"spying". 40 This could be seen as a hint of the solution to the
negotiations, the one that was eventually adopted.
On February 19, Washington publicly acknowledged that two
U.S. planes had violated China's airspace. This unusual statement could be interpreted as a further indication of willingness to
bargain. At the end of February, the United States suggested
submitting the dispute to the International Court of Justice at the
Hague. North Korea rejected this proposal in early March because
the United States would not first admit "espionage".
39. New York Times, March 20, 1969.
40. Christian Science Monitor, February 16, 1968.
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On May 8, at Washington's request, Pyongyang presented a
long written list of accusations concerning both the Pueblo and
U.S. foreign policies. U.S. leaders were divided about its acceptance. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs Paul Warnke felt that it "was so outrageous that you could
sign it. I felt that we were taking a worse beating by keeping those
men over there than we would by signing something right away,
undergoing some momentary pain and getting them back."
Others, such as Undersecretary of State Katzenbach, agreed that
the North Korean statement could and should be signed. 41
North Korea had said, however, that agreement to its
document would not be sufficient to secure release of the crew.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs Walt Rostow therefore advised against
signing the document. Moreover, South Korea implicitly exercised
an inhibiting influence through its obvious bitterness at the
prospect of a "deal" between Washington and Pyongyang.
On May 28, the U.S. negotiator and Panmunjom offered a
partial repeat of the device that had resolved the 1964 crisis signing a "receipt" (a technique called an "overwrite") once the
men were produced. North Korea rejected this because the United
States would not admit that the Pueblo had been on an espionage
mission. About six months later, as noted above, North Korea
accepted a compromise. The United States would sign the North
Korean document acknowledging spying and simultaneously
issue a statement denying the same charges.
Each participant wished to end the negotiations successfully.
Pyongyang wanted this result because it realized that it might not
be able to depend on Soviet military support. Furthermore, as the
United States explicitly reminded it, if the talks were not
successfully concluded by the end of December, North Korea
would then have to negotiate with a new and perhaps tougher
opponent - President Richard M. Nixon.
At the Panmunjom meeting on December 17, the United States
presented two alternate positions; an "overwrite" and a "prior
repudiation" scheme. In both, the United States would have
signed the document. One would include the denial in the
document and the other would involve refuting the paper after
release of the crew. The U.S. negotiator threatened that the United
States would be forced to withdraw from the negotiations if North
Korea did not agree to one of these proposals. "There would be no
41. Armbrister, A Matter of Accountability, p. 298.
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further meetings. The North Koreans would have to deal with the
Nixon Administration." 4 2
Mr. Nixon himself had signaled a rigid image, and this point
of view had been beamed to Korea in the Korean language. Part of
his acceptance speech at the Republican Convention in May 1968,
for example, read, "When respect for the United States of America
falls so low that a fourth rate military power like North Korea will
seize an American naval vessel in the high seas, it is time for new
leadership to restore respect for the United States of America." 43
Later in the presidential campaign, Nixon said of the Pueblo,
"What we should have done was to bring in the power to defend
that ship or get it out of those waters."
The crew of the Pueblo was released on December 23.
D. Evaluation

The deployment of a task force in the Sea of Japan did not
persuade North Korea to release the Pueblo's crew at an early
date. Indeed, the reverse may have been the case. The deployment
of the force without an actual strike at North Korean targets
proved that the strongest power in the world could be successfully
challenged. North Korea viewed the fact that it had seized the
Pueblo and suffered no retaliation as a victory. Secretary of State
Dean Rusk had declared that the abduction was "an act ofwar". 44
President Johnson had quickly sent a sizeable naval force toward
the crisis area. But U.S. bombs were not dropped, neither landing
nor invading forces were dispatched, and the naval forces did not
closely approach the coastal waters of North Korea. The United
States' "bluff' had been called. The threat of using military force
was conveyed by harsh verbal demand and the movement of
military forces. But as it became evident that violence was not to
be used, North Korea- which at first had expected an attackbecame more confident during the negotiations. These negotiations began and ended with the same North Korean demands,
demands that were eventually met. This lesson, moreover, that the
U.S. show of force was only demonstrative, was most probably an
important factor in North Korean planning for its next confronta-

42. Ibid., p. 335. According to Armbrister, this emphatic position was
suggested by Nicholas Katzenbach, and sent to the U. S. negotiating team at
Panmunjom and then presented to the Koreans.
43. New York Times, August 8, 1968.
44. New York Times, January 25, 1968.
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tion with the United States. This same example was undoubtedly
appreciated by the Communist military in Southeast Asia.
This is not to say that a more satisfactory outcome from the
U.S. perspective would have resulted from the use of violence
against North Korea. The probable results of a retaliatory strike
were grim: death of the crew, continued conflict of an indeterminate nature between the United States and North Korea and
increased hostilities by the North against South Korea.
On the positive side, the incident did strengthen communications and tacit understanding between Moscow and Washington.
Moscow was reassured when the United States did not lash out
militarily at North Korea, even as Washington demonstrated that
it had the capibility to do so. At the same time, as a consequence
of the Pueblo episode, both superpowers came to understand the
USSR was not responsible for the military adventures of North
Korea. Pyongyang learned that it could not depend on either
China or the USSR for automatic military assistance.
III. THE EC-121

President Johnson's initial reaction to the Pueblo's capture
had been to search for a response in proportion to the provocation.
Similarly, when North Korea shot down an unarmed U.S. Navy
reconnaissance plane with thirty-one men and six tons of
electronic equipment on board about ninety miles off the North
Korean coastline on April 15, 1969, President Nixon's first
inclination was a "quick, clean" military retaliation. There had
been 190 similar missions in the same area in the three months
before this crisis. All of these flights took place without threats
from North Korea. 45 Consequently, the destruction of the EC-121
was unexpected and sudden. According to those who were with
him at the time, the President "fumed when his military advisors
failed to come up with what he considered practical ways to
retaliate." 46 An unnamed administration official commented at
the time, "Had sufficient force been available to stage the raids
after the President tentatively made up his mind to respond, I
believe the attacks would have been ordered." 47
In sum, the "lessons" of the Pueblo had not been implemented. There had not been an escort for the EC-121 intelligence
45. Transcript of President Nixon's Press Conference of April 18, 1969, New
York Times, April 19, 1969.
46. Ibid., May 6, 1969.
47. Ibid.
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plane (again, because similar U.S. missions in the same area had
not been fired upon), and there had not been enough conventionally armed aircraft on "strip-alert" to come to the EC-121's
assistance even if there had been adequate warning.
The puzzling problem for Washington was: If other planes
had not been fired upon, why was this plane shot down without
warning? The event occurred on Premier Kim Il Sung's fiftyseventh birthday, perhaps not a coincidence, but certainly not the
sole cause. Another reason for this incident may have been the
airlifting of 1,200 United States combat troops from North
Carolina to South Korea in mid-March. The operation, called
"Focus Retina," transported this force to participate with South
Korean soldiers against a "surprise attack from a third country".
Everyone undoubtedly understood that the "third country" was
North Korea.
North Korea was likely to have understood the swift transfer
of U.S. troops to South Korea as a threat. In the week preceding
the arrival of the 1,200 U.S. soldiers, there were three armed
clashes, initiated by the North, in the demilitarized zone.
Interestingly, the North Korean media did not mention "Focus
Retina" until after the shooting down of the EC-121. But then, a
month after the operation, it referred to the U.S. airlift as "very
provocative". 48 It is conceivable that the attack on the EC-121 in
April was the North Korean response to the U.S. operation in midMarch. Pyongyang may well have thought that the risk of a
violent U.S. military response, given U.S. behavior following the
Pueblo, was not very great.
President Johnson did not have a familiar precedent upon
which to base his response. President Nixon, on the other hand,
did have an analogy from which to work, one in which both the
parallels and the differences were clear. Nixon drew on the Pueblo
mainly as a lesson of what not to do. His moves and speeches
indicate that the response to the Pueblo incident convinced Nixon
not to bluster without action. Nixon thus avoided saber rattling,
concentrating instead on diplomacy. As Henry Gimmel of the
Wall Street Journal noted:
The big difference is that the previous Administration
initially huffed and puffed up its crisis as if it intended to do
something; it then appeared genuinely astonished at discov48. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts (April
17, 1969), FE/3052/ A3/l.
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ering it dared not. This Administration's initial reactions
have exhibited no such illusions . . . . The reality, as the
Nixon team judges it, is that popular toleration of even one
war is in remarkedly delicate condition. 49
There was another vital difference between the two Korean
crises. In the case of the Pueblo, the lives of the crew were still at
stake. In the EC-121 incident, it soon became apparent that the
lives of the crew were no longer a consideration. Rather,
minimizing the consequences of the crisis through diplomatic
channels was the central feature.
It seems evident that the failure of the United States to
retaliate militarily following the seizure of the Pueblo strengthened the militant policy line of the more "hawkish" group within
the North Korean leadership. Between 1967 and 1969, many
leaders of the (relatively) "moderate" leadership were purged. The
militants had argued for a closer alliance with the USSR,
combined with an independent, highly nationalistic foreign
policy. These two goals came into some friction when the USSR
endeavored to remain apart from the Pueblo crisis. These more
radical leaders, however, whatever the degree of help that the
USSR had provided, could persuasively argue that the United
States probably would not retaliate if there were another incident.
Mter all, the same factors that restrained the United States in
1968 still obtained in 1969. The outcome of the second incident
was less to the liking of North Korea, however. A dramatic
demonstration of U.S. military capability (in the form of a
massive naval exercise), combined with a blatant lack of support
from the USSR, weakened the position of the militants favoring
additional challenges to the United States.
In fact, Moscow publicly criticized the shooting down of the
EC-121. Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgomy, visiting Pyongyang shortly after the plane was shot down, said that "collective
action" was necessary to repel U.S. warships and planes.
Diplomatic observers in Moscow read this as a reproach to North
Korea.
Senior diplomats believe that the single-handed challenges
by North Korea to the United States have caused profound
doubts among Soviet leaders. While loyally supporting its
ally in public, Moscow has also given signals that it does not
49. Wall Street Journal, April 18, 1969.
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want the incidents to lead to a confrontation with the United
States in the Far East.50
Pentagon analysts said they believe that the USSR had
probably warned the North Koreans against a repetition of the
Pueblo and EC-121 incidents. These analysts also thought that
the USSR would not support North Korea in future incidents.
While no one wished to force a test of this hypothesis, it did
encourage detente between the United States and the USSR
because Washington now had somewhat more cause to trust the
peaceful intentions of Soviet leaders. 51
A. The U.S. Response

President Nixon's initial reaction to the shooting down of the
EC-121 was to seek military options. Several sources suggest that
he quickly started the machinery of government moving toward
development and execution of such a response. Two North Korean
targets were selected and a speech had been prepared to explain
the retaliation to the public. The President believed that a "quick,
clean" retaliatory blow might signal both Hanoi and Pyongyang
that they were dealing now with a "tougher" administration in
Washington, a signal that was particularly desirable because of
the administration's plans to withdraw troops slowly from
Vietnam. 5 2
Before retaliation, however, military force had to be available.
In response to this need, Task Force 71 was assembled. With 256
war planes, it was able to muster more firepower than the U.S.
Mediterranean Sixth Fleet. Task Force 71 included four carriers
(Enterprise, Ticonderoga, Ranger and Hornet), three cruisers
(Chicago, Oklahoma City and St. Paul) and fifteen destroyers. 53
' 50. New York Times, May 15, 1969.
51. Ibid., April 24, 1969.
52. New York Times, May 6, 1969; Marvin and Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Little,
Brown and Company, 1974), p. 94. This source says that both President Nixon and
National Security Adviser Kissinger initially agreed with the military recommendation. President Nixon requested that Kissinger ask for the suggestion of each
member of the National Security Council. The Kalbs believe that Secretary of State
William Rogers' position - a cautious, non-military retaliation - was shared by
most of the advisers, and eventually accepted by Nixon and Kissinger.
53. New York Times, April 24, April 26, 1969. Task Force 71 was originally
intended to include twenty-three warships; General Wheeler's April 25th testimony
gave the figure as twenty-nine. Pentagon information sources placed the goal at
forty vessels, to include at least three attack aircraft carriers, one antisubmarine
carrier, three cruisers, twenty-two destroyers and at least five submarines. The
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On April 16, U.S. forces in and near Korea were placed on
alert and readied for the contingency of any further incidents. At
the same time, however, U.S. reconnaissance air activity was
suspended until North Korea's military intentions could be
clarified. The official U.S. negotiator at Panmunjom demanded
neither an apology nor reparations. The United States did,
however, ask North Korea to "take appropriate measures to
prevent similar incidents in the future," and urged it to
"acknowledge the true facts of the case." 54
A fate similar to that of Task Force 77, formed during the
Pueblo crisis, now befell Task Force 71. By the time it had been
formed and entered the Sea of Japan on April21, the original plan
for retaliation against North Korea had been reversed. As it had
in 1968, Washington decided to risk neither a military struggle
with North Korea nor the developing detente with the USSR. The
rapid appearance of the fleet off the Korean coast did, however,
vividly demonstrate U.S. military capabilities. Thus, it would
appear that both task forces minimized the risk of weakness to
North Korea which saw that it could initiate crises and even kill
Americans without retaliation.
Following this decision, the deployment was soon drawn
down. The Pentagon had attempted to minimize the additional
cost that such a large task force would incur by explaining that
many of the same vessels had operated off Vietnam and,
therefore, that the cost to move and operate them off of Korea was
about the same. Within a week of its dispatch, Task Force 71 was
reportedly reduced to the Enterprise and seven destroyers. Senator
Henry Jackson later stated that the withdrawal of the task force
was caused by "cost effectiveness since [i]t doesn't make much
sense over a long term to require a whole fleet . . . to support air
reconnaissance.''55
B. Why Restraint?

Arguing against a military reprisal was the time needed to
mobilize the necessary force. President Nixon also was concerned
that the U.S. public might view a military retaliation for the EC121 as hauntingly parallel to the air strikes that followed the 1964
Gulf of Tonkin incident and led to the large-scale involvement in
actual deployed task force- consisted of four carriers, three cruisers and fourteen
destroyers.
54. New York Times, April 18. 1969.
55. Ibid., April 28, 1969.
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the Vietnam war. This same factor had argued against a military
retaliation during the Pueblo crisis.
The major military options presented to the President were: (1)
a limited air strike on the North Korean bases that had sent up
the planes responsible for shooting down the EC-121; (2) a
blockade of the North Korean coast; (3) an air strike on all North
Korean air bases; and (4) an attempt to lure a North Korean ship
or plane outside of its territorial waters and then destroy it. 56 Each
of these possibilities ran the hazard of provoking a secondary
reaction from North Korea, China, the USSR or a combination of
these adversaries. This was considered less of a risk, however,
after Moscow and Peking failed to demonstrate active military
support for North Korea during the Pueblo crisis. The USSR, for
example, could have sent additional military assistance in a
noticeable manner to signal its active support for North Korea. It
did not send such signals.
The President's military advisors, while in favor of some form
of a tough response, were well aware of the attendant risks which
could result in another war. The President's civilian advisors also
cautioned a restrained reaction. Defense Secretary Melvin R.
Laird, for example, was described as "not enthusiastic" about air
strikes. Secretary of State William P. Rogers who had argued for a
course short of retaliation met half a day after the attack for a
fifteen-minute talk with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin.
The State Department said that the meeting was "not in any way
a protest," but rather an appeal for assistance. Secretary Rogers,
in a careful speech (similar to the Johnson Administration
statements of a year earlier which were meant to signal cautious
intent to various audiences) before the American Society of
Newspaper Editors on April16, declared, "The weak can be rash;
the powerful must be more restrained. Complexity in affairs
should teach us the need to act responsibly, to constitute
cooperation for coercion and to move from confrontation to
negotiation on the issues that divide nations." 57 This statement
was an indication of Washington's recognition that apart from a
military strike, which ran the risk of a larger war, there was little
it could do to influence or punish North Korea directly.
The administration was impressed by the strongly favorable
response that followed the delay in retaliation, and each
56. Ibid., April 17, 1969.
57. Ibid.
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statement urging restraint reinforced the view the President had
reached after careful deliberation (the reverse of his initial
visceral reaction) that the moderate stance was the correct one.
Senator Everett M. Dirksen, a Republician who had been even
more critical of President Johnson's handling of the Pueblo than
had been Mr. Nixon, commented on possible reaction to the EC121. "I don't like to see the blood lust come so quickly." Senator
Gale McGee of Wyoming, a Democratic conservative on foreign
policy said, "In our world today, with electronic spying, there are
bound to be such cases. It is essential in this case, as in the Pueblo
case, that we don't lose our cool and set in motion irretrievable
action which could heighten the crisis." (It is noteworthy that
both Dirksen and McGee were "hawks" in the context of the
Vietnam war). Perhaps the major exception to the general call for
caution was Representative L. Mendel Rivers, Democratic chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, who said, "There
can be only one answer for America: retaliation - retaliation retaliation." 58
The balance of public opinion favored restraint, however. On
April 18, a New York Times editorial summarized this popular
support for a policy of military caution:
When President Nixon speaks out for the first time at a news
conference today on North Korea's shooting down of an
American intelligence plane, he will be under no serious
public pressures to alter his policy of prudent restraint. Most
Americans appear convinced that ill-considered military
reprisal will merely make a tragic situation much worse . . . .
What the nation does expect of Mr. Nixon - and will
incessantly demand - is immediate presidential action to
fulfill his campaign promise that: "What happened to the
Pueblo should and will be avoided in the future." 59
At his nationally televised press conference of the 18th, President
Nixon stated:
I have today ordered that these flights be continued. They
will be protected. This is not a threat. It is simply a matter of
fact . . . Looking to the future, as far as what we do will
depend upon the circumstances. It will depend upon what is
done as far as North Korea is concerned, its reaction to the
58. Ibid., April 16, 1969.
59. Ibid., April 19, 1969.
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protest and also any other developments that occur as we
continue these flights. 60
Although it did not directly say so, this statement reflected
Washington's changed perception of the USSR's role in Korea's
crises. Mter Secretary of State Rogers met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin at noon on the 15th, the USSR had offered naval
assistance in searching for possible EC-121 survivors. At his press
conference, the President described the U.S. military action as
"restrained" because of the possibility that "other parties might
be involved." This apparently was a reference to the defense
treaties North Korea shared with China and the USSR, a factor
that had also constrained President .Johnson's employment of
force in the Pueblo crisis.
There appeared to be little parallel between Washington's
implicit suspicion that the USSR had been somehow involved in
the Pueblo incident and any Soviet role in the EC-121 situation. In
a dramatic departure from the reticent stance of the USSR during
the Pueblo incident, two Soviet destroyers on April 17th quickly
began to help in the search for the wreckage of the EC-121, at the
same time as U.S. planes and ships. One Soviet destroyer
retrieved a wheel and ladder from the EC-121 and laid them out on
the deck. The debris was described by radio to a low-flying U.S.
Hercules C-130, and the plane was invited to photograph the
remnants of the EC-121. At the conclusion of this vivid
demonstration of cooperation, the Soviet vessel radioed to the
departing U.S. plane. "Soviet Destroyer, Red Banner Pacific Fleet,
sends condolences in connection with the loss of your aircraft." 61
At his press conference of April 18, President Nixon
emphasized the nature of this cooperation and removed any
thought that he blamed the USSR for the EC-121. Again, this was
in marked contrast to the early suspicion that the USSR was
involved in the Pueblo crisis.
The President described the Soviet role in the plane incident
as first
one of being of assistance to the United States in recovering
the debris and looking for survivors.· And we are most
grateful to the Soviet Union for helping us in this report. Our
intelligence - and of course no one can be sure here indicates that the Soviet Union was not aware that this
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid., April 20, 1969.
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attack was to be made. North Korea is not a nation that is
predictable in terms of its actions. It is perhaps more than
any other nation in the Communist bloc completely out of
control of either the Soviet Union, or for that matter,
Communist China. . . . It was completely a surprise attack
in every sense of the word and, therefore, did not give us the
opportunity for protective actions that I would have taken
had it been threatened. 62
This spoke simultaneously to various audiences. With the
recognition that the USSR had not been the antagonist and the
suggestion that perhaps it had been saddled with an i1·:rational
Korean ally, a signal had been dispatched suggesting that
cooperation in analogous situations in the future would 1::e
welcome. North Korea was warned not to attempt to repeat its
action because U.S. military power, represented by Task Force 71,
would be prepared for a quick response. However, considering that
North Korea had now successfully challenged the United States
twice within fifteen months, this was a rather weak threat. A
subdued, brief phrase told China that it was understood that
Peking had not engineered the crisis. And finally, a message of
reassurance was sent to domestic audiences that U.S. military
forces would be protected in the future.
On April 22, the New China News Agency (NCNA) quoted a
senior U.S. Defense Department official. "Russian willingness to
render assistance has been astonishing. From the way they are
doing things at present, they look like allies instead of opponents
in the cold war." 63 NCNA then condemned the "servile compliance" of the USSR. It should be noted, however, that in 1969
China was emerging from the cultural revolution which had
intensified Chinese doubts about both Soviet and U.S. aggressive
intentions. The Ussuri River crisis of March 1969 over the SovietChinese border had also amplified China's fear of the USSR. An
opportunity to encourage some change in Peking's foreign policy
perceptions seemed more possible now than it had. Consequently,
the President's recognition that neither China nor the USSR had
investigated the incident provided a basis for further contacts
with both countries.

62. Ibid., April 19, 1976.
63. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts (April
23, 1969), FE/3055/ A2/1.
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The Nixon administration continued to balance adroitly the
demonstration of its military capabilities with an improvement in
several bilateral relationships. On April 17, Japanese Foreign
Minister Kiichi Aichi had urged the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo not to
embark on a retaliatory action. On April 17, Japanese Premier
Eisaku Sato commended the United States for responding to the
EC-121 incident in a "cool, quiet and serious way". 64 On April 21,
Washington officially notified the Japanese government that it
would not use Japanese bases to protect U.S. reconnaissance
planes. Tokyo then asked to have Task Force 71 moved from the
Sea of Japan. Japan worried that it might be drawn into the
hostilities if a crisis such as the EC-121 should occur in that area
at some time in the future.
With a similar concern of becoming involved in a Korean-U.S.
conflict, the USSR publicly requested on April 20 the removal of
the naval fleet from an area south of its major port city of
Vladivostok. The U.S. response was to explain that the reinstituted reconnaissance flights needed protection and emphasize
that it was Korea, not the USSR, that had been responsible for the
downing of the EC-121.65
The now smaller fleet was then moved to the Yell ow Sea on
April 26, and part of the protection for the reconnaissance planes
was taken over by forces based in South Korea. However, the
promise to South Korea of military aid of $100 million, made at
the time of the Pueblo crisis in January 1968, had been only half
fulfilled by late April 1969. The F-4 fighters the United States
agreed to make available in February 1968 were now scheduled for
delivery in August 1969. Therefore, in order both to reassure its
South Korean ally, nervous about conflict with North Korea and
to provide security for its own reconnaissance flights, Washington
was prompted to move rapidly on the year-old arms agreements.
Twenty U.S. Air Force F-4 jets were added at this time to the 128
U.S. planes already in South Korea. Two more F-4 squadrons were
also scheduled to replace the Air National Guard F-100 squadrons
that had been mobilized after the Pueblo. These had been
promised in 1968; the second Korean crisis assured their delivery.
A New York Times editorial provided a strong endorsement of
the administration's overall policies toward the EC-121 crisis
while also questioning the degree of force used.
64. Facts on File, April 17-23, 1969, p. 235.
65. New York Times, April 27, 1969.
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The withdrawal of Task Force 71 from the Sea of Japan and
the deployment of a much smaller force southwest of Korea
reflects prudent second thoughts in Washington . . . . [T]he
original fleet of 29 vessels was far out of proportion to the
requirements of its mission of protecting United States
reconnaissance planes. Although this "surge" operation
perhaps served a useful purpose in demonstrating how much
American power used to be put into the area, on short notice,
the long-term presence of such a formidable fleet would have
been far too expensive and would have risked provoking the
kind of confrontation it was designed to discourage .
. . . It should be possible to provide adequate cover for
essential reconnaissance missions less provocatively and
more cheaply, using land-based planes from augmented
squadrons in South Vietnam. The North Koreans, after all,
were brazen, but not necessarily brash in attacking an
unarmed, unprotected American plane off their coast two
weeks ago. They had good reason, especially after the Pueblo
affair, to believe that the United States would be cautious . . . .
If American forces should violate North Korean territory,
the Koreans might very well react in a way that would
precipitate a wider war. President Nixon's withdrawal of
Task Force 71 indicated that he is keenly aware of this
danger. 66
IV. RESULTS OF THE TWO KOREAN CRISES

The 1968 Pueblo and 1969 EC-121 crises may be viewed as
separate acts in the same drama. In each, North Korea sought to
demonstrate its ability to challenge U.S. military credibility apart
from Soviet direction. It assumed that the achievement of this
goal could be more easily attained because the United States had
committed much of its military, economic and public support to
the Vietnam war. Particularly in 1968, Pyongyang expected that
it could rely on the USSR for firm support. As a corollary of
establishing its own autonomous, intensely nationalistic identity,
North Korea sought to indicate to South Korea that it could not
depend on the United States for continued military assistance.
North Korea had mixed success with these ambitions in 1968. The
United States did not go to war over the seizure of the Pueblo. It
66. Ibid., May 1, 1969.
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did, however, give to South Korea large-scale military aid and
assurances of its support against threats from the North. Rather
than undermining the alliance between the United States and
South Korea, the two crises provoked by North Korea seemed to
inject further life into the coalition.
At the same time, the USSR failed to use even symbolic
military levers on North Korea's behalf. Nonetheless, North Korea
had encountered only a demonstration of force by the United
States. North Korea had affirmed an independent policy and the
United States had not responded violently. This gain had been
offset, however, by North Korea's appreciation of an increasing
lack of military support from China and the USSR.
These impressions were reinforced during the 1969 crisis. U.S.Soviet cooperation developed into a dramatic, concrete reality. The
United States, for example, did not propose a formal debate in the
United Nations which might have embarrassed the USSR by
forcing it to defend the shooting down of the EC-121. Meanwhile,
the USSR criticized North Korea for its lack of "collective action".
Moreover, negotiations and political agreements between the
United States and the USSR continued to progress. These
developments gave North Korea cause to worry about the
reliability of its Soviet ally.
Both Washington and Moscow appeared satisfied that the
ambiguity suggested by the mobilization and movement of armed
force inhibited a confrontation into which each could conceivably
have been drawn. An example of the unfulfilled possibilities of
Washington's responses was given by President Nixon at his
press conference on April 18, 1969. "I do not want to leave the
impression that the announcement of the renewal of, and the
continuation of, reconnaissance flights is the final action that can
or will be taken here. Our action in this matter will be determined
by what happens in the future." 67
The demonstration of the potential use of military force in the
1968 and 1969 crises allowed two advantages. First, if it had any
such thoughts previous to the incidents (which seems unlikely),
North Korea was deterred from expanding them. Second, the
incidents provided a "learning experience" for the USSR and the
United States of how they could control the consequences of
incidents neither of them wanted. This message was particularly
noteworthy in view of concurrent events in Europe.
67. Ibid., April 19, 1969.
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It was a curious coincidence that the EC-121 crisis took place
at the same moment that Alexander Dubcek was ousted from the
leadership of Czechoslovakia under Soviet pressure. The United
States had announced that it would not stand aside for another
armed intervention in Czechoslovakia. 6 B It would appear that, to
some extent, the EC-121 provided an opportunity for both states to
reassure the other that they could cooperate.
A major negative consequence of not using military force in
the Pueblo crisis was that it did provide an example that would
not inhibit the Communist states in Southeast Asia from future
uses of force. It may even have encouraged North Korea to take
another strong step. The lack of retaliation in 1968 apparently
encouraged North Korea to try again in 1969. The absence of
violence in 1969, however, had quite the opposite effect. The
incidence of subversion and violence across the demilitarized zone
initiated by North Korea fell from 761 in 1968 to 134 in 1969. 69
Violence in Korea further diminished in the 1970s. It is not clear
why these incidents diminished, but one suspects that Soviet
behavior was crucial.
V. THE MAYAGUEZ

On April 17, 1975, all remaining U.S. personnel had left
Phnom Penh just in advance of the victorious Cambodian
revolutionaries; the same pattern was repeated in Saigon on April
30. Because of these two spectacular U.S. foreign policy defeats,
U.S. decisionmakers came to fear that trust in its commitments to
its allies had weakened. The USSR, China and revolutionary
movements of smaller countries envisaged a total U.S. withdrawal
from Asia, while the confidence of the American public in its
nation's foreign policy goals faltered.
The U.S. merchant ship Mayaguez was seized on May 12 by
Cambodian gunboats while in a well-traveled shipping lane in the
Gulf of Siam on a voyage from Hong Kong to Sattahip, Thailand.
It had a crew of thirty-nine, and it carried a cargo of both military
and commercial goods. Of the 184 containers the Mayaguez
carried, 107 contained nonmilitary material and 77 held such
"military" items as clothing, furniture and small arms destined
for U.S. installations in Thailand. Almost immediately after the
68. "The Nixon Administration has warned the Soviet Union that any violent
repression by Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia will once again interrupt progress
toward strategic arms limitation talks, diplomatic sources said today." Ibid.
69. Clough, East Asia and U. S. Security, pp. 163-64.
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incident, President Gerald Ford announced that he "considered
the seizure an act of piracy," and added that a failure to release
the ship "would have the most serious consequences." 70 These
phrases contained two familiar echoes: The emotional word
"piracy" had been the term used by Washington to describe the
seizure of the Pueblo and it recalled the value of ambiguous
threats employed by Presidents Johnson and Nixon during the
two Korean crises. But this time the threat was not to be idle.
Mter the loss of Saigon, President Ford was quoted as saying, "I
have to show some strength in order to help us ... with our
credibility in the world." 71 The day after the incident, "high
ranking sources" told the New York Times that "the seizure of the
vessel might provide the test of determination in Southeast Asia
... the United States had been seeking since the collapse of allied
governments in South Vietnam and Cambodia." 72 These brief
quotations do not "prove" a cause and effect relationship between
a worry about the loss of U.S. reliability and the nature of the
response in the Mayaguez incident, but they certainly provide
strong reason to suspect such a relationship. Moreover, regardless
of its genesis it was anticipated that the firm response to this
crisis would warn adversaries and reassure allies and U.S.
citizens as to the stability of U.S. commitments.
Placing the capture in a historical perspective, since 1950, 123
U.S. commercial vessels had been fired upon and seized by
Ecuador. Fines were paid to gain the ships' release. The pattern
followed in these cases was described proudly by the U.S. Counsel
General in Ecuador in the Department of State's Newsletter of
April 4, 1974, as having "centered on negotiations rather than
retaliation." 73
A. The U.S. Response

The U.S. government contacted China's liaison office in
Washington and the Royal Cambodian Embassy in Peking
asking for help. Prince Sihanouk and the Chinese Foreign
Ministry returned the notes, as did the Cambodian Embassy.
When asked about what China would do during this crisis, First

70.
71.
72.
73.

New York Times, May 13, 1975.
Washington Post, May 26, 1975.
New York Times, May 14, 1975.
U. S. Department of State, Newsletter, April 4, 1974.
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Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing, in Paris at the time on a state
visit, responded, "There is nothing we can do." 74
This was a parallel to the Pueblo incident. In each situation,
the United States had sought assistance from what was
considered to be the major backer of the target state - a supporter
which, presumably, should be able to control its "weaker" ally. In
the Pueblo crisis, the USSR had not actively supported North
Korea's position because of a distrust and displeasure with
Korea's "adventure" undertaken without coordination with
Moscow. These same elements were present in the relationships
among China, Cambodia and the United States, and may have
hindered the developing "understandings" between Washington
and Peking.
In 1968 the judgment had been to rely on Soviet and not
Chinese intercession; in 1975 the decision of whom to ask for
assistance was reversed. This seemed a logical choice. Phnom
Penh Radio, in celebrating the Communist victory on May 12,
1975, for example, declared, "The victory of the Cambodian people
is the victory of the Chinese people. The strategic unity between
Cambodia and China which is the base of our friendship will last
forever." As in most such broadcasts, there was no mention of the
USSR, and accounts by Western observers reported that the
Soviet Embassy had been sacked by the revolutionaries. Consequently, it was reasonable for Washington to seek communication
with Phnom Penh through Peking.
No casualties had been reported by the Mayaguez. While he
was investigating diplomatic channels, President Ford also
ordered surveillance of the ship. During this aerial observation, a
P-3 Orion was hit by fire as it flew over the Mayaguez
(considering that the Khmer Rouge had previously been the
targets of U.S. aircraft, they now probably did not take the time to
determine that the P-3 was only an observer plane, nor would they
necessarily have been able to ascertain that fact). Surveillance
established that the ship was anchored about a mile off Koh Tang
Island, about thirty miles from the coast of Cambodia. The
aircraft also reported seeing some of the crew being off-loaded
onto small Cambodian boats. Efforts were made to stop these
boats, because Washington feared that the crew might be taken to
the mainland, where Cambodia would recreate the Pueblo
situation, a lengthy detention with the seamen pictured in
74. New York Times, May 16, 1975.
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Cambodia's propaganda as "aggressors and spies". To prevent
the transfer of the crew to the mainland, U.S. A-7 aircraft fired
alongside and in front of, but not directly at the small boats. Still,
three Cambodian boats were sunk and several others were
damaged. A problem, however, was to decide which Cambodian
vessels had Americans aboard. "Every effort was made and in one
case the ship that got in was allowed to go in because it appeared
there were some Caucasians on board." 75 It should be noted that
this demonstrated the constraints placed on violence, similar to
the cautious U.S. military response to the Pueblo situation.
The Coral Sea, an aircraft carrier then on its way to
Australia, and several destroyers were ordered to the area. In
addition, 1,100 Marines were airlifted into Bangkok, Thailand.
Based on Okinawa, they were moved to Nakhon Phanom Air Base
in Thailand in preparation for possible action. This move caused a
very heated reaction by the Thais, who not only demanded that
the United States not use Thai territory as a base of operations,
but that the recently arrived Marines be withdrawn.
Two days after the ship's seizure, the destroyer Holt entered
the area, followed by the Coral Sea, the destroyers Baussell and
Wilson, the guided missile frigate Gridley and the supply ship
Vega. The aircraft carrier Midway was also ordered to the general
area. The President, still not having received word of the crew's
release, took two steps to set in motion further military action. He
discussed the situation with the National Security Council for the
fourth time in just over two days, and he met with bipartisan
leaders of both parties in Congress to tell them of his plans.
At 7:15 P.M., Phnom Penh sent its first message agreeing to
release the ship, stating that the Cambodian government "will
order the ship to withdraw from Cambodian water." The message
was sent over Phnom Penh Radio, but in the Khmer language,
which in Washington apparently raised some question as to
whether it represented a definitive governmental position. This
message was monitored by the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service, translated, and then relayed to Washington. The
translation was delivered by Defense Secretary James Schlesinger
to the President at 8:15 P.M. 76 It was later learned that the crew
75. "Seizure of the Mayaguez," Hearings Before the Committee on International Relations and Its Subcommittee on International Political and Military
Affairs (GPO, 1975), p. 9.
76. Ibid., p. 37. These are Washington D. C. times given in the Congressional
testimony.

THE PUEBLO

37

had been freed by the Cambodians before the attacks on Koh
Tang Island, placed on a previously captured Thai boat, and told
to return to the Mayaguez. Cambodian Deputy Premier Ieng Sary
declared in September that Cambodia had decided to release the
Mayaguez and crew after calling local commanders to Phnom
Penh, but did not broadcast the decision until the following
morning. Later that morning, the United States bombed Ream
and Sihanoukville. 77 If this is an accurate recounting, the
bloodshed that followed was not necessary to secure the Mayaguez's release. The release of the crew occurred about 8:00P.M. on
May 14.
A helicopter assault by approximately 200 Marines was begun
on Koh Tang Island. Three of the helicopters involved were shot
down, one on the beach, one just off shore and the last, involving
the loss of thirteen lives, several miles out to sea. The Marines
encountered much stiffer resistance than they had expected and
were unable to make the sweep of the island they had originally
planned. Although there were only an estimated 150 Cambodians
on the island, they were armed with 75 mm. recoilless rifles,
Claymore mines and rockets, in addition to small arms. The
Marines received heavy air support, with anywhere between
twelve and twenty U.S. planes over Koh Tang at any given time
during the incident. In fact, 479 sorties by both helicopter and
fixed wing aircraft were flown during the crisis, of which 300 were
of a tactical nature, as opposed to surveillance or rescue. At 9:00
P.M., Marines from aboard the destroyer Holt boarded the
Mayaguez with no resistance and searched the ship. They found
no one. The official U.S. answer to the Cambodian offer to free the
ship was that the United States would stop military action when
the crew was free, since the ship had already been recaptured.
While the Marines were occupying both the Mayaguez and
Koh Tang Island, the crew members were on their way toward the
destroyer Wilson which reported spotting them about 10:45 P.M.
Thirty crew members were on board by 10:53 P.M. As was later
discovered, the crew had been held on Rong Sam Lem Island,
about twenty nautical miles from Koh Tang. In short, U.S.
intelligence had not been strong, it had not been aware of the
precise movements of the crew between the ship, Koh Tang, the
mainland, and Rong Sam Lem Island, nor of the size of the force
on Koh Tang Island.
77. Neu· York Times, September 9, 1975.
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It was not until 11:45 P.M. that Schlesinger reported the
retrieval of the crew to the President. The aircraft from the Coral
Sea had already begun taking off to carry out strikes on the
mainland, although they did not begin to attack until about 11:00
P.M. In short, the attacks began after the crew was safely
returned. The aircraft attacked in three waves, the first not
dropping any ordnance, but "buzzing" Sihanoukville, the second
attacking Ream airbase, destroying seventeen planes on the
ground, damaging a hanger and making craters in the runway.
The third wave attacked a petroleum, oil and lubricant installation near Sihanoukville at 11:50 P.M., thirty-four minutes after the
President had called for a cessation of operations. These raids
were later justified as necessary to prevent reinforcement of Koh
Tang and to deter the Cambodians from launching air strikes
against the Marines on the island, in addition to proving that the
United States was serious in its demands. Another important
justification for the raids was the support and pride now being
revived among the American people after the dual losses in the
same area earlier in the year.
With the crew rescued, all that remained was to extricate the
Marines from the island and go home. It was not until just after
7:00A.M. the next morning that the Marines began to leave Koh
Tang, and by 9:20A.M. they were clear of the island and on board
the Coral Sea. The entire incident, from the time the ship was
seized until the Marines left, took only seventy-eight hours. The
total number of American deaths was forty-one.7B The Cambodians lost a total of eight boats, seventeen aircraft, the air field and
the installation (the casualties from bombings and straffing are
unknown).
B. Domestic Pressures

The 1975 Appropriations Act for the Department of Defense
contained a provision prohibiting the use of U.S. military forces in
Indochina. It provided that "[n]one of the funds herein appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or
indirectly combat activities by U.S. military forces in or over or
from the shores of North Viet Nam, Laos, or Cambodia."
This would appear to be an explicit denial of the use of
military force. But before the U.S. evacuation of Saigon in April
1975, State Department legal advisors reportedly told the White
78. "Seizure of the Mayaguez," pp. 127, 129 and 131.
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House that such provisions did not specifically prevent the
inherent right to protect American lives. They cited such
precedents as the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900 and the
Dominican Republic in 1965. 79
Because American lives were thought to be threatened, the
President was able to respond under the War Powers Resolution of
1973. This act directs the President to "consult" with Congress "in
every possible instance - before committing armed forces to
hostilities or to situations where hostilities may be imminent." He
must then report to the Congress in writing forty hours before
initiating the action. Consultation is not "synonymous with
merely being informed." Rather,
consultation in this provision means that a decision is
pending on a problem and that Members of Congress are
being asked by the President for their advice . . . and . . .
their approval of action contemplated. For consultation to be
meaningful, the President himself must participate, and all
information relevant to the situation must be made available. tlO
It later became a question whether or not the President had
"consulted" with Congress about his Mayaguez decisions.
Regardless, during the week of the crisis, the sense of Congress
supported the ship's retrieval and the crew's release, even if the
use of force was necessary. "Members of Congress generally
expressed approval of the President's action and the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee adopted a strong resolution of
support this evening acknowledging the President's constitutional
right to order military operations." 81
Conservative members were the most outspoken in favor of
violent retaliation. Senator John Sparkman, chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee commented, "We should
retrieve the vessel any way we can." Senator James B. Allen: "I
don't favor precipitate action, but it's a question of national honor
... and if force is necessary, then force should be used." Senator
John Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee
79. New York Times, May 14, 1975.
80. "War Powers: A Test of Compliance," Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on International Security and Scientific Affairs of the Committee on International
Relations, 94 Cong. 1 sess. (May 7, and June 4, 1975); "Legislative History of the
Consultation Provision of the War Powers Resolution," pp. 46-47.
81. New York Times, May 15, 1975.
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said, "The attack and seizure cannot be tolerated .... We must be
as firm and as severe as necessary to protect Americans on board
and to assure their safe return as well as the recovery of the ship
... as well as the honor of our country." Senator James Buckley
suggested that "failure by the United States to react swiftly and
clinically will only invite further outrages against personnel and
property of U.S. citizens. I therefore urge the President to order
immediate punitive air and naval attacks on appropriate targets
in Cambodia."s2
On May 12, Senator Jacob Javits counseled patience with
Cambodia, suggesting that it "may not realize what is involved in
their reaction." There were several congressional protests,
moreover, advanced by "moderates," that the President had not
fulfilled the directives of the War Powers Resolution. Senator
Hubert Humphrey, a sponsor of the 1973 Act, on May 14 (while
military action was in progress), endorsed the use of force "if
necessary," but added that "we want consultation," not merely to
be informed after an act is taken. Senator Mike Mansfield stated
on the same day, "I was not briefed . . . nor was I consulted before
the fact about what the Administration had already decided to do.
I did not give my approval or disapproval because the decision
had already been made in both cases." 83 House Republican Leader
Hugh Scott also said on May 14 that he had only been "advised,"
not "consulted". But support was widespread in the Congress for
the strong measures taken by the President.
It was apparent, therefore, that domestic pressure for some
form of military action was greater in response to the seizure of
the Mayaguez than to the shooting down of the EC-121. In the
final hours of the Indochina war, even congressional doves
seemed to feel the necessity to reassert U.S. prerogatives in an
area of the world where only recently U.S. prestige had suffered
such a severe setback. The call for an armed response to the
Mayaguez was overwhelming, reflecting, perhaps, ten years of
frustration and ultimately defeat in Southeast Asia, defeats that a
nation unused to losing found hard to understand. Thus, the
incentive to strike out with even so flimsy an excuse as the
Mayaguez.

82. Ibid., May 13, 1975.
83. Ibid., May 16, 1975.
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C. Related Events

As it had in the Pueblo crisis, Washington charged that the
Mayaguez had been seized without any warning. Only in the
narrowest of defmitions, however, was this accurate. The
Cambodian coast had recently seen similar incidents. On May 2,
seven Thai fishing boats had been fired upon. The Korean
Transportation Ministry then cautioned ships to avoid the area
around Poulo Wai and Koh Tang islands. This warning had been
passed on to the U.S. State Department. On May 7, a Panamanian
freighter had been detained for one day. On May 13, another
Panamanian vessel had been fired on and detained for two hours.
At about this same time, the Swedish vessel Hirado was also fired
upon, seized and held briefly. None of these cases, however,
caused the U.S. government to issue warnings to U.S. merchant
vessels in the area. 8 4
The U.S. Defense Hydrographic Center had not issued a
warning about the waters off Cambodia before the seizure of the
Mayaguez because, as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
explained at a press conference on May 12, insurance companies
had the responsibility to provide information about potential
conflict situations on the seas or in shipping lanes. Carl
McDowell, President of the American Institute of Marine
Underwriters, replied that insurance firms had not received any
information about the troubled Gulf of Siam. 85 However, within
five hours of the seizure of the Mayaguez, the Center issued the
following:
Special Warning: Shipping is advised until further notice to
remain more than 35 nautical miles off the coast of
Cambodia and more than 20 nautical miles off the coast of
Vietnam including off-lying islands. Recent incidents have
been reported of firing on, stopping and detention of ships
within waters claimed by Cambodia, particularly in the
vicinity of Poulo Wai Island. 8 6
84. For the Department of State's explanation of why these warnings were not
sent, see System to Warn U. S. Mariners of Potential Political! Military Hazards: S.
S. Mayaguez, A Case Study (Department of State, Defense, and Commerce,
February 11, 1976), p. 11.
85. James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, United States Foreign Policy and
World Order (Little, Brown and Company, 1976), p. 540, Fn. 132.
86. The conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam has been long standing. For
an example of a hattie over these same islands, see New York Times, March 2,
19.'56. For an assessment of the oil deposits in this area, see the Far Eastern
Economic Review (September 20, 1974).
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Three additional factors may have helped to explain the
seizure. First, Cambodia seemed to believe that the Mayaguez had
a hostile intent. Cambodia's use of force against a ship sailing in
waters that it claimed were its own territorial waters is easier to
understand in this light.
Second, there is the likelihood that the seizure was conceived
and executed by local authorities. Cambodian Deputy Premier
Ieng Sary, in a September 1975 interview, claimed that Phnom
Penh learned of the attack "through American broadcasts,
because the American technology is able to convey information
much faster than our armed forces can." The seizure, Sary said,
occurred without prior order. After the event became known, the
commander in Sihanoukville was ordered to Phnom Penh, where
he was told to release the Mayaguez. Moreover, Secretary of State
Kissinger stated at his press conference on May 13 that he was
aware that the seizure might have been "the isolated act of a local
commander." Thus, both sides were aware of the possibility of
local causation.s7
Information Minister Hoa Nim stated on Phnom Penli Radio
on May 17 that the ship had been captured only to examine the
cargo and crew. Because there were precedents of foreign ships
being seized, searched and released, the Cambodians looked upon
the U.S. military action not even as a heavy-handed attempt to
free the crew, but as an excuse to do further damage to
Cambodian territory and possibly to destroy the new state.
Third, the most intriguing, one month after the capture of the
Mayaguez, Vietnam seized Poulo Wai Island from Cambodia. This
area had been contested by the two countries since before the
Second World War. The continental shelf from which the island
rises is thought to be rich in oil. With this knowledge, it is also
possible to view Cambodia's activities in the Gulf of Siam in the
spring of 1975 as an attempt- at least in part- to demonstrate
its own independence from Vietnamese territorial demands. ss
87. Ieng Sary's quotation is in Newsweek, Far East edition (September 8,
1975). Secretary Kissinger, at his May 13, 1975, Press Conference, also commented:
"I am not inclined to believe that this was a carefully planned operation on the
part of the Cambodian authorities."
88. Cited in James Nathan, "The Mayaguez, Presidential War, and Congres·
sional Senescence," Intellect (February 1976), p. 361. Also see Nathan and Oliver,
United States Foreign Policy, pp. 527-32. A factor not clear when this paper was
originally written has since become more evident: the already (1974-1975) fierce
border conflicts between Cambodia and Vietnam. This historical and present
situation may have given further rise to the active hostility and suspicion of a
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D. Outcome

On May 17, at the concluaion of the crisis, Kissinger declared
that the event reminds the world that:
There are limits beyond which the United States cannot be
pushed .... We believed that we had to draw a line against
illegal actions and secondly, against situations where the
United States might be forced into a humiliating discussion
about the ransom of innocent merchant seamen for a very
extended period of time ... make clear that the United
States is prepared to defend these interests, and that it can
get public support and congressional support for these
actions. 89
This provided an implicit reminder that an incident such as
the Pueblo would not be allowed to recur. It communicated this
message to the American people and to an international audience
of friends and adversaries. It emphasized that the dramatic losses
in Southeast Asia would not be permitted to weaken U.S.
determination to protect its nationals and their property.
The next day, Kissinger left for a round of conferences in
Europe. President Ford was scheduled to visit these same allies
shortly thereafter. These were to be the first high-level meetings
with the European allies after the Communist victories in South
Vietnam and Cambodia. The rapid, intense military response to
the seizure of the Mayaguez preceded the Kissinger and Ford trips
as a demonstration of the will and strength of the United States.
The President, appearing on both American and British
television on May 24, 1975, emphasized this message. The U.S.
response to the Mayaguez crisis "should be a firm assurance that
the United States is capable and has the willingness to act in
emergencies, in challenges. I think this is a clear indication that
we are not only strong, but we have the will and the capability of
moving." 90
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger echoed the theme that the
U.S. response in the Mayaguez event would signal continuing
American self-confidence:
American action must be firm when necessary and when
important issues of principle are involved . . . in all
U.S. vessel sailing close to Cambodia's shore after leaving Saigon. Far Eastern
Economic Review, April 21 and June 9, 1978.
89. Neu· York Times, May 18, 1975.
90. Ibid., May 25, 1975.
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likelihood the U.S. commitments to Northeast Asia, to Korea
as well as to Japan, will be perceived as something no one
should challenge . . . . As long as we are bound by the
treaty, of course, it would include Taiwan.9 1
These clear statements by the President and the secretaries of
State and Defense provided evidence to allies - particularly
those in Asia (Taiwan and South Korea) which feared a repeat of
the U.S. military withdrawal from Indochina- that U.S. will and
capabilities could be relied upon.
This signal had also been sent to opponents. The administration's domestic popularity rose moderately as the general public
felt relief that after the long "tunnel" of Vietnam, an American
victory of sorts, had been won. The Gallup polls of June 1975, for
example, indicated support for the Mayaguez action; 51 percent
approved, 33 percent disapproved and 16 percent had no opinion. 92
On April 16, at the end of the crisis, Senator Barry Goldwater
seemed to have summarized this sense of catharsis:
This one act of Ford could be the act that elects him. You
know I haven't always been solidly with him, and I've
opposed him as much as I've backed him, and I've had
serious doubts about his leadership, and they were dispelled.
It was the kind of decision it takes a strong man to make. 93
An ironic example of the "ripple-effect" of this crisis was that
it assisted the establishment of relations between Thailand and
the People's Republic of China. The Thai ambassador to the
United States, Anand Panyarachun, had been recalled to
Bangkok as a protest against the U.S. use of the air base at
Utapao to support the Mayaguez. He subsequently headed a
delegation to Peking to "lay down all necessary ground work" for
the establishment of diplomatic relations.
At least in the short run, however, the Mayaguez itself could
only serve as a symbol to Thailand, not as the single cause for a
basic change in policy. Anand, for instance, was careful to
explain:
I don't think that the basic agreements that we have entered
into with the United States need to be changed.... I think
that in this country there is a very large reservoir of goodwill
91. U. S. News and World Report (May 26, 1975).
92. The Gallup Opinion Index, June 1975, p. 2.
93. New York Times, April 17, 1975.
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and friendship toward the people of the United States and
toward the American nation. . . and these basic points will
not be affected by a review.9 4
He emphasized that the Thai diplomatic move was intended to fit
Thailand in with the rapidly changing circumstances in the
region. "We are not deserting one friend in order to have new
friends. We are not deserting anybody and we are not going to
undermine any old friendship," he declared. The current review is
to "remove some of the fat without affecting the meat," he said,
"and I think that if the United States looks at our review
questions in this light it will see that this is not an anti-American
measure nor is it an attempt either by the government or by the
people to raise any sort of anti-American storm." 95 It would
appear that the Mayaguez incident, with its apparent gains in
credibility for the United States and the concomitant flexibility of
Thailand, encouraged a more flexible arrangement in East Asia.
Washington apparently thought that Thailand could now
open relations with China, while still maintaining confidence in
its U.S. military alliance. It also might seem, however, that the
intense and abundant use of military force was in the long run
counterproductive. The massive use of power against a weak
country may have reinforced the image of an arrogant United
States. This, in turn, might conceivably raise doubts about the
value of U.S. commitments. Thailand's reaction may serve as an
example. An unnamed Thai "Foreign Ministry official" called the
U.S. sinking of the Cambodian gun boats "an act of madness ...
taken with no thought for the consequences to Thailand." 96
Messages of congratulations from other allies were couched in
cautious terms. The West German Foreign Ministry noted that it
had "a certain interest in seeing the American trend to dejection
and discouragement in foreign affairs come to an end." The
Japanese deputy foreign affairs minister said that the U.S.
operation was a "joint action for the rescue of Americans from
piracy". The public reaction in the United Kingdom was generally
favorable, but some officials had privately expressed disquiet over
what they considered a precipitate use of force. 97

94.
95.
96.
97.

Bangkok Post, June 9, 1975.
Ibid.
Washington Post, May 15, 1975.
Facts on File, May 17, 1975.
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In summary, the expense, both in terms of lives lost and the
finances necessary to mount the military forces, the weak
intelligence (not learning where the crew was held) and the
inordinate use of power added up to a bottom line of mixed gains
and losses. Domestically, this use of force was popular and it was
viewed as a partial vindication for the earlier losses in Indochina.
In terms of the credibility of U.S. foreign policy among American
allies, however, this intense application of military force probably
has been appreciated externally as a spasmodic reaction born of
failure. Consequently, trust in U.S. commitments may have been
strained, rather than advanced. The question among allies may
have been, "Is it necessary for one of my neighbors - or myselfto suffer severe losses before the United States will honor its
commitments."
VI. EVALUATION

In these three cases, U.S. options, particularly those involving
the use of military force, were limited. In 1968, conventionally
armed forces needed for an immediate response were not
available. This physical limitation was reinforced by the fact that
energies and attention were directed toward Vietnam. These
physical restraints were also present during the EC-121 crisis, and
indeed were strengthened by the desire to avoid a wider incident
that might have affected the improving U.S. relations with China
or the USSR. Improving relations with both states, of course, was
a key feature of the new Nixon foreign policy. Residual domestic
opposition to the U.S. involvement in Vietnam also restrained the
President's choices.
In 1969, as the USSR readily responded to Washington's
request for assistance in searching for the EC-121 debris, the presence of U.S. force in the area encouraged the two major countries
to speak to each other as "military equals". Each shared the
problem of a highly nationalistic and headstrong ally, each
sought to assure the other of its own desire to avoid war. The presence of a U.S. fleet in the area, which was moved away from the
coast of the USSR, apparently at Soviet request, provided a new
step in the great powers' "learning process". In this sense, the
U.S. Fleet - and the accompanying Soviet ships and planes was highly functional.
The later Mayaguez crisis was at the other end of the
continuum. It appears likely that the crew would have been
released without the degree of military force that was used. This
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dramatic use of U.S. military power seems to have been motivated
mainly to signal audiences beyond Phnom Penh of U.S. will and
military strength.
The results of each of the first two crises served as lessons
learned for the next two. A lesson from the Pueblo was not to
allow the crew onto the mainland. Once the crew of the Pueblo
was removed, military action was useless. President Ford was well
aware of this. The Pueblo was also a lesson in the frustration that
results from not being able to mobilize force quickly during a
crisis.
In contrast to the Pueblo and the EC-121 crises, the Mayaguez
incident occurred at a time when Washington could call on much
of the military establishment, if need be, without worrying about
diverting resources from a second crisis. Presidents Johnson and
Nixon, on the other hand, had only limited men and material
available, and had serious concerns about beginning a new war,
when large numbers of U.S. military personnel were still involved
in Southeast Asia. U.S. options and tactical machines were taxed
to the fullest as a result of the Vietnam war.
The Pueblo and EC-121 incidents both occurred close to shore
and close to Korean air bases. Furthermore, they occurred in an
area very close to the USSR, China and Japan, an area fraught
with political tension. The Mayaguez occurred in the Indochina
area, a region where there was considerable residual U.S. military
strength (especially in Thailand). The Vietnamese, although
noting the U.S. "imperialism" of the act, did not become involved.
Thus, President Ford was acting in a region in which the United
States could use quick and effective force without the threat of
massive retaliation. Johnson and Nixon were caught in an area
that was politically volatile (Korea) and had the potential to
create a major outbreak of violence. The Mayaguez concerned
Cambodia, where a new regime was not prepared to respond
rapidly to the U.S. retaliation. The Pueblo and EC-121 involved
North Korea, a stable Communist regime that was technologically
and politically capable of quick reaction to U.S. pressure. Ford's
Cambodian adversaries were weak. Johnson's and Nixon's
Korean adversaries were strong. In none of these three crises did
the USSR or China give military assistance. But this "lesson"
was evident only after the Pueblo crisis.
The Pueblo was much closer to the coast than the Mayaguez,
which meant that there was more time to do something about the
Mayaguez before it reached the coast after being seized. The
Pueblo proceeded to Wonsan at approximately 15 knots. As such,
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with the few stops that Commander Bucher made, it could have
taken some two hours to reach Wonsan, or longer. Had conventionally armed aircraft been on "alert," it is conceivable that the
Pueblo could have been helped.
The Mayaguez originally seemed to be heading for Sihanoukville, but stopped short of the coast at Koh Tang Island. This
allowed the United States enough time to get aircraft into the air
and strafe the ship to keep it stationary. Both incidents occurred
at about the same time of day, yet the reconnaissance flights over
the Mayaguez continued despite the darkness. It might be
suggested that the United States responded to the Mayaguez
incident with greater efficiency. It might be the case, however,
that the military, or Washington, was simply more determined to
act.
It is noteworthy that there had been a conspicuous lack of
protection in each of these cases. The Pueblo sailed alone, with
neither an escort, nor readily available, conventional armed
planes on "alert" in a nearby location. The EC-121 had been in the
similar situation of lacking a guard. Also paralleling the reason
for the Pueblo's lack of an escort, in the three months before the
shooting down of the EC-121, 190 similar flights had flown in the
same general area without a shooting incident. Therefore, it was
felt that this EC-121 did not need protection. The Mayaguez, a
commercial ship following a normal sea lane of transport, did not
consider itself in need of protection. However, it was in an area
that had witnessed contest and seizures.
After the Pueblo crisis Washington's fear of Soviet or Chinese
intervention in support of North Korea was lessened as neither
offered help during the Pueblo or EC-121 crises. During the
Mayaguez crisis, neither China nor the USSR offered military
assistance to Cambodia.
The U.S. military reaction to all three crises demonstrated the
inapplicability of the concept of proportional response to aggressive acts. 98 During the 1968 Korean crisis, Washington did not
have the available conventional force needed to alter the target's
immediate behavior. In 1969, it similarly lacked a conventional
nearby force for instant response. The pause caused by this
unavailability allowed time for both the Johnson and Nixon

98. New York Times, April 17, 1969; Michael Hamm, "The Pueblo and
Mayaguez: A Study of Flexible-Response Decision-Making," Asian Survey, (June
1977).
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administrations to be praised for their "restraint". Consequently,
the longer the hesitation before military retaliation, and the more
the U.S. government was assured by its allies and public that it
had taken the proper course of patience, the less likely a military
response became in both incidents.
In the Mayaguez situation, the proportionality principle was
discarded altogether. It would appear that force well beyond that
which was needed was employed. Domestically, this led to an
infusion of confidence (though perhaps only temporary). Of more
importance in foreign policy, the failure to utilize flexible response
had other, apparently beneficial, results. The People's Republic of
China saw evidence that even as the U.S. armies were leaving
Southeast Asia, U.S. military power would be available to help
balance Soviet power in the area. At the same time, the USSR
may have been assured that the United States could be relied
upon to counter China's plans to dominate its southern flank.
The smaller countries in Asia, however, may have felt
unsettled by what could be considered the United States' hasty
resolution of a minor situation. Would the United States turn 180
degrees in another crisis affecting Taiwan or South Korea and
refuse to become involved militarily?
A partial answer may have been provided in August 1976,
when North Korea challenged the United States with a violent
attack on its soldiers at Panmunjom. North Korea did not suffer
military retaliation, although force was available for this purpose.
The United States did show force, but did not use military
violence. President Kim Il Sung, however, in his first direct
message to the United States since 1953, avoided the intense
rancor usually present in North Korean propaganda. The
retaliation by the United States for the seizure of the Mayaguez
did not prevent the 1976 incident, but it apparently helped to
prompt a conciliatory North Korean response soon after, such as
proposals of private talks with the United States and division of
the Panmunjom negotiating site, which had previously been
proposed by the United States.
Violence had not been used by the United States during the
Pueblo and EC-121 incidents. It had been used abundantly in the
Mayaguez crisis. Perhaps the 1976 Korean event suggests the
ineffectiveness of the 1968 and 1969 responses - lack of military
retaliation accompanied by military movements. While it is to be
hoped that the Mayaguez reaction can be avoided in the future, it
should be recognized that a benefit of that reaction was to bolster
the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments to Japan, South
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Korea and Taiwan, each of which maintains defense agreements
with the United States and to caution potential U.S. adversaries.
1968, 1969 Korean Crises
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